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Modelling thought in language use:
At the crossroads between  
discourse, pragmatics, and cognition1
This article studies a number of semantic and pragmatic phenomena with conse-
quences for the development of discourse. Thus, our study of the way we make 
use of cognitive models in discourse allows us to postulate the principle of 
“Metaphoric Source Selection”: the metaphorical extension of a concept can only 
select partial structure from this concept to construct the metaphoric source. The 
recognition of degrees of centrality in semantic specifications underlies the “Pe-
ripherality Principle”, a discourse principle grounded in the “Principle of Rele-
vance”: when the most central characterization of a concept is not capable of cre-
ating discourse coherence, speakers turn to less central specifications and select 
the one that best satisfies the conditions of relevance. We then address the ques-
tion of the pragmatic grounding of so-called cohesion and coherence in discourse. 
We claim that ellipsis and substitution are discourse phenomena subject to prag-
matic constraints and argue for the existence of the “Conceptual Structure Selec-
tion Principle”, which accounts for the semantic scope of ellipsis and substitution 
devices: these have within their scope as much structure as is not cancelled out by 
the discourse unit that contains the cohesion device. We have redefined the cohe-
sion-coherence distinction as one between procedural and conceptual connectivity 
and have formulated two further principles of discourse connectivity: the “Princi-
1 This research has received financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education and 
Science, grant no. HUM2004-05947-C02-01/FILO, which is co-financed through FEDER 
funds. The authors are grateful to Annalisa Baicchi (University of Pavia), Francisco Gon-
zálvez (University of Almería), and René Dirven (Duisburg University) for their valuable 
comments on the earlier drafts of this paper. Any remaining flaws are the authors’ sole re-
sponsibility.
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ple of Iconicity” and the “Principle of Conceptual Prominence”. There is a large 
amount of evidence that iconic arrangements are an important aspect of discourse 
coherence. Still, there is little work done with respect to the principles that regu-
late non-iconic arrangements. The Principle of Conceptual Prominence, which ac-
counts for the special discourse status of prominent non-iconic information, fills 
this vacuum. The final part of this research work focuses upon the analysis of dis-
course strategies as non-conventional sets of procedures that allow speakers to 
create and interpret procedurally and conceptually connected texts. Two reverse 
discourse strategies are formulated, both related to the balance between procedural 
and conceptual markers of discourse connectivity. To this we add two other dis-
course principles, the “Principle of Internal Contrast” and the “Principle of Exter-
nal Contrast”. The former is based upon explicit procedural operations, whereas 
the latter makes use of conceptual connectivity. Lastly, we distinguish two more 
discourse principles that constrain strategic discourse activity: the “Principle of 
Conceivability”, which regulates conceptual links with situations in terms of the 
possibility of creating plausible mental scenarios for them; and the “Principle of 
Relative Distance”, which helps sort out ambiguities in anaphoric operations on 
the basis of the relative distance between the anaphoric pronoun and its potential 
antecedent as licensed by the Principle of Conceivability. 
Keywords: discourse; pragmatics; cognitive models, metaphor; metonymy; cohe-
sion; coherence; discourse connectivity; relevance, ambiguity; iconicity. 
1. Introduction 
This article is concerned with the connections between semantics, pragmatics, 
and discourse. The underlying assumption for this enterprise is the belief that 
discourse processes cannot be independent of semantics and pragmatics.
Discourse analysis has been done with a number of different goals in mind. 
Some researchers have had information management as their main concern. By 
information management is meant how information is delivered, stored, and 
processed (cf. the work of Clark and Clark, 1977, or Johnson-Laird, 1983, 
1988). This approach has evident links with work in psycholinguistics, espe-
cially in the field of human information processing (Aitkenhead and Slack, 
1985; Lindsay and Norman, 1977; Smyth, 1987; Van Dijk, 1999). Other dis-
course analysts have worked with a varied array of languages; they have been 
involved in finding regularities and frequencies in the occurrence of certain phe-
nomena, and in setting up a classification of discourse types (e.g. narrative, pro-
cedural, behavioural; see Longacre, 1976, 1983; see also Forster, 1977; Gläser, 
1979; van Dijk, 1980; Werlich, 1983; Dressler and Eckkrammer, 2001; Lemke, 
2001). Still others like Dowty, Wall and Petyers (1981) and Seuren (1985) take 
a formal approach to discourse and try to determine how sentences are mapped 
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onto their truth-conditions within a context. Finally, those working in the tradi-
tion of conversational analysis have been concerned with the structural proper-
ties of conversation and the rules that regulate how people take part in them (cf. 
Aijmer, 1996; Biber, 1988, 1989; Brown and Levinson, 1987; Brown and Yule, 
1983; Cook, 1989; Gumperz, 1982; Halliday, 1989; Sacks, 1972; Sacks, Sche-
gloff, and Jefferson 1974; Tannen, 1989).
The approach to discourse that will be taken here has strong links with the ini-
tial work on information management and with the studies on cohesion and co-
herence (cf. Beaugrande and Dressler, 1981; Harris, 1963; Dressler, 1972; van 
Dijk, 1977; van Dijk and Petöfi, 1978; Swales, 1990). There is one difference, 
though. Our proposal makes use of the connection between cognitive modeling 
(as part of semantics) and inferential pragmatics (especially relevance theory) in 
an integrated way. In this view, semantics supplies rich characterizations of con-
ceptual structures and the way they combine, while pragmatics explains how the 
different forms of providing access to conceptual structure are exploited for 
communication purposes. Discourse, in its turn, focuses on how text is con-
structed and interpreted in a coherent manner as directed by the way conceptual 
structure is managed on the basis of pragmatic principles. Discourse activity is 
thus grounded in semantics and pragmatics. 
2. Theoretical preliminaries 
2.1. Deriving meaning from utterances
Consider the following conversational exchange2:
A: What’s that? 
B: It’s a cat. A black cat. 
A: I can see it’s a cat.  
B: Then why are you asking me? 
A: What’s that cat doing here? 
From the development of this piece of conversation, it is clear that speaker A 
was not asking B to identify a certain entity. Rather, he was trying to express his 
discomfort about a situation involving a black cat. In order to clarify his posi-
tion, speaker A expands his initial expression “What’s that?” into “What’s that 
2 Adapted from the opening dialogue in the book Tsi-Tsa: The Biography of a Cat, by George 
Mikes (1988, Harmondsworth, Penguin). 
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cat doing here?” However, neither the initial expression nor its paraphrase 
comes close to a literal specification of what speaker A wants to say. In fact, the 
actual meaning of his message could be paraphrased as: ‘There is a cat here that 
disturbs me and you should have done something about it.’ Speaker A is not ac-
tually asking for information about the actions carried out by the cat. This must 
be evident to both speaker and addressee in the context of production of the ut-
terance.
What is more, there seems to be little doubt in speaker A’s mind that his ad-
dressee will be able to determine with accuracy the real intent of his clarifica-
tion, even though it is by no means explicit. We may wonder why this is so. In 
this connection, several observations are in order: 
(a) Meaning derivation is usually not a matter of decoding a message; more 
often than not, meaning is obtained through what we may call cued in-
ferencing, i.e. inferential activity carried out on the basis of prompts 
provided by the linguistic expressions in connection to a context. 
(b) Linguistic expressions, or utterances in general, are usually underspeci-
fied or underdetermined. This is a fact that has often been pointed out 
by pragmaticists and philosophers of language alike. Frege (cf. the dis-
cussion in Perry, 1977) made a distinction between “sense” and 
“thought”: the former was directly derived from the linguistic expres-
sion and had to be completed by means of sense completers which al-
lowed speakers to derive full propositional representations or “thought”. 
Ideas like this are at the basis of proposals like Sperber and Wilson’s 
explicature-derivation mechanisms such as disambiguation, fixation of 
reference, and enrichment (Sperber and Wilson, 1995). In this way, in a 
sentence like She’s getting ready, we obtain a full semantic representa-
tion, with its corresponding truth value, only after assigning a referent 
to the personal pronoun (e.g  ‘Mary’) and after deciding upon what it is 
that Mary is getting ready for (e.g. ‘Mary is getting ready to go to the 
party’). Other linguists have addressed this issue in some detail (cf. 
Carston, 1988, Recanati, 1989, Bach, 1994, Levinson, 2000). 
Even though utterances are usually underspecified, speakers trust that they 
will make meaning in context. In Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995), 
it is generally argued that utterances are ideally designed by speakers to be op-
timally relevant, i.e. to achieve the intended range of contextual effects for the 
least amount of production and processing effort. This is indeed a rather risky 
enterprise but at the same time it gives speakers a fairly large amount of freedom 
to operate strategically. Speakers exploit semantic underdetermination for their 
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own communicative purposes. In the dialogue at the beginning of this section it 
is clear that speaker B was aware of the real communicative intent of the initial 
question of speaker A; however, speaker B chooses not to respond as A would 
have expected simply on the basis of the room provided by the inherent inde-
terminacy of A’s turn.   
Speakers are intuitively aware of the mechanisms that govern conversational 
behaviour. It is the analyst’s task to determine what these mechanisms are and to 
inquire into their nature. So far, the pragmatics literature only reports on a few 
such mechanisms, like Sperber and Wilson’s explicature-derivation devices 
mentioned above. However, these mechanisms are insufficient to account for 
many every-day non-explicit expressions like the following: 
(1) What’s the time? – It’s three [it is two minutes past three in fact] 
(2) Your brother is absolutely crazy! [the addressee’s brother is in his right 
mind but his behaviour gets on the speaker’s nerves] 
(3) What’s that child doing in the garden? [the child is doing something that 
disturbs the speaker] 
(4) Where do you think you’re going? [the speaker doesn’t want  the ad-
dressee to go] 
(5) Who’s been messing with my computer? [the speaker already knows the 
answer to his question; he’s upset that someone has been using his com-
puter without asking for permission] 
(6) What’s that metal taste in my mouth? - Maybe it’s your silver fillings [the 
speaker wants to identify the source of the metal taste] 
(7) This is Harry! [pointing to a mug of beer] 
(8) I’m parked out back [the speaker holds out the key to his car] 
(9) Nice day today! [it is pouring with rain] 
(10) She’s a lovely little doll! [speaker points to a little girl] 
Interpreting expressions like these goes far beyond disambiguation, reference 
fixation and enrichment. Thus, (1) involves an intentional inaccuracy in a con-
text in which being accurate would probably be not only unnecessary but also 
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odd; (2) is a common, every-day example of hyperbole where by crazy the 
speaker refers to a particularly irritating form of behaviour; (3) is not a question 
but an expression of surprise and uneasiness on the part of the speaker at what-
ever the child is doing; (4) and (5) also express irritation at the addressee’s ac-
tions; (6) is a metonymic expression in which identifying the kind of taste stands 
for the source of the taste; (7) and (8) are also metonymic: in (7) Harry stands 
for Harry’s drink, while in (8) I stands for the protagonist’s car; (9) is a piece of 
irony (stating the opposite of what is evidently the case); and finally (10) is a 
metaphor whereby we see a little girl as having attributes comparable to those 
that a doll has.
We may legitimately wonder about what mechanisms allow us to interpret ut-
terances like the ones above in no time, without much effort, and in an appropri-
ate way in connection to the context in which they are produced. Relevance 
theorists would argue that it is all a matter of the speaker searching for the rele-
vance of each utterance. But while it may be admitted that relevance is a global 
guiding principle, it is also true that relevance alone does not tell us why (3) 
should express annoyance, while (6) simply enquires into the origin a certain 
taste in the speaker’s mouth. In fact, it may be argued that (3) and (6) are exam-
ples of different grammatical constructions with their own conventional mean-
ings. In (3) we have an example of what Kay and Fillmore (1999) have labelled 
the What’s X doing Y construction, which has a certain conventionalized mean-
ing associated with it (e.g. speakers use this construction to refer to situations 
that bother them). It is very likely that this kind of added meaning was originally 
implicated meaning obtained on the basis of some implicature-derivation proc-
ess like the following: if the speaker is asking about the identity of an action that 
is evident from context, then the hearer must assume that the speaker has a cer-
tain attitude towards that action. The idea is that if the speaker asks about an ac-
tion that is evident to speaker and addressee, his question is to be understood as 
a way of calling the addressee’s attention to the fact that he has neglected to act 
in accordance to what is expected of him. The whole inferential process takes 
the form of the following reasoning schema: 
Implicated premises:  
X shouldn’t be doing A;
S knows that X is doing A;
H knows that X is doing A. 
Both S and H believe that X shouldn’t be doing A 
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Reasoning schema:
If H believes that X shouldn’t be doing A, H should have done some-
thing to prevent X from doing A.  
Since X is doing A, it follows that H has not prevented X from doing 
A.
Sentence: What’s X doing? 
Implicated conclusion: S’s question cannot be a request for information, 
since A knows what X is doing, but a way of calling A’s attention to the 
fact that H should stop X from doing A. 
In (6) the search for relevance probably guides the addressee to understand that 
he is not being questioned about the kind of taste since that information is al-
ready provided by the speaker; the reason why the addressee chooses to interpret 
(6) metonymically is probably a matter of selecting the conventional construc-
tion that will allow him to make sense of the expression in its context: What’s
that N? may be used either to identify a referent or to ask about the origin of N.  
So each expression above makes use of one of a number of mechanisms that 
facilitate meaning derivation: we have loose (or intently inaccurate) uses of lan-
guage, metaphor, metonymy, hyperbole, irony, and conventional constructions 
incorporating formerly implicated meaning. It is possible to think of such 
mechanisms as cognitive operations of some sort.
As observed above, semantic underspecification, while being economical 
from the production/processing point of view, is a risky enterprise. Speakers 
know that the process may involve misunderstanding. However, this is a calcu-
lated risk. Linguistic systems have a number of resources to repair misunder-
standing. Consider expressions like: What do you mean by that?, Could you say 
that again?, Do you really mean …?, Why are you asking me?, So?, What do 
you have in mind?; and many others. Speakers often expect their addressees to 
be able to infer the meaning of what they say while remaining safely indetermi-
nate. It is up to the addressee to come up with the full range of meaning effects 
of an utterance. The addressee may stop wherever he feels satisfied, i.e. when he 
feels that he has obtained the intended amount of meaning. If the addressee 
gives signs that he has not understood properly or that he is under too much of a 
processing burden, then it is up to the speaker to rephrase his message in a way 
that will produce the intended meaning. 
122 J o s é  L u i s  O t a l  C a m p o ,  F r a n c i s c o  R u i z  d e  M e n d o z a :   M o d e l l i n g  t h o u g h t  i n  l a n g u a g e  u s e
2.2. Semantics, pragmatics, and discourse
For working purposes and in spite of the considerable amount of controversy 
around this topic, we will make the following assumptions: 
(i) Semantics is concerned with assigning meaning to organized sound 
strings.
(ii) Pragmatics is concerned with the principles of language use: how speak-
ers make intentional and skilful use of lexicogrammatical resources in 
order to communicate in an effective way.  
(iii) Discourse focuses on the construction and interpretation of meaningful 
text, i.e. procedurally and conceptually organized text.3
Since semantics, pragmatics, and discourse share a common concern with mean-
ing, i.e. with making sense of linguistic expressions, it is not farfetched to postu-
late a set of relations among these three levels of linguistic enquiry. Here it will 
be postulated that a full account of the meaning impact of utterances like (1)-
(10) in the preceding section needs to be carried out from the vantage point of 
the convergence of semantics, pragmatics, and discourse. It will further be 
claimed that each of these levels of description carries with it a set of internal in-
teracting principles and constraints that provide the input for the next level to 
become operative. By way of illustration, take an example of the What’s X doing 
Y? construction mentioned above: 
(11) Husband to wife: What’s that child doing in the kitchen by himself? 
At the level of semantics, the construction supplies a relevant part of the mean-
ing of this utterance, i.e. the idea that the child is up to some mischief that wor-
ries or even annoys the speaker. At the level of pragmatics—although this will 
vary considerably depending on our assumptions about the speaker—the utter-
ance may be interpreted as a way of asking the addressee to do something that 
she should have done to prevent the child from being in the kitchen by himself. 
At the level of discourse, we will focus on the potential that this example of the 
What’s X doing Y? construction, pragmatically interpreted as a warning, has to 
create meaningful interaction. The speaker may expect a range of possible an-
swers:
(12) (a) I don’t know. I’m not really sure. 
3 By “text” we will understand the result of communicative activity; the label “discourse” is 
more aptly applied to the way in which text is created. See in this respect Brown and Yule 
(1983).
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(b) Do you want me to go and check? 
(c) You know what he’s doing. 
(d) Does it bother you? 
(e) Why should I take care of him? 
(f) He’s fine, don’t worry. 
(g) He’s not doing anything wrong. 
(h) You know kids will be kids. 
(i) What can I do? I can’t be looking after him all day long. 
But not others: 
(j) Mars is a red planet. 
(k) I have bought some cranberries for dinner. 
(l) Chomsky is a great linguist. 
Each of the answers from (12.a) to (12.i) are instances of a different kind. Thus, 
(12.a) addresses the most literal aspects of the construction thereby ignoring the 
pragmatic interpretation of the utterance as a warning; (12.b) casts the addressee 
into the role of nonchalant acceptance of her duties with respect to the child; 
(12.c) and (12.d) challenge the speaker’s right to tell off the addressee, one by 
restating what is obvious to both speaker and addressee (this is an indirect way 
of turning the responsibility for the child over to the speaker), the other by ques-
tioning what is evident from the constructional meaning itself, i.e. that the 
speaker is bothered by the situation (with the implication that the addressee is 
surprised about the speaker’s complaint); (12.e) challenges the speaker’s as-
sumption that the addressee should be looking after the child; (12.f) works on 
the basis of the (constructional) assumption that the speaker is worried and tries 
to reassure the speaker about the child’s safety; (12.g) reassures the speaker with 
respect to the child’s potentially mischievous actions; (12.h) is an apparent tau-
tology that is resolved by ascribing to the child the stereotypical values that we 
associate with children in general (i.e. children are always up to something, but 
they will rarely engage in forms of behaviour that will result in irreparable dam-
age); finally, (12.i) challenges the speaker’s assumption that it is the addressee’s 
task to look after the child on a continuous basis.
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There may be many other possible responses to the question What’s the child 
doing in the kitchen? but all of them will have to fall into one the following gen-
eral categories: 
(i) Agree with the speaker as to the semantic (i.e. constructional) and prag-
matic implications of his message (i.e. the addressee believes that since 
the speaker is bothered by the situation she has to do something about it) 
(ii) Agree with the speaker as to the semantic but not the pragmatic implica-
tions of his message (i.e. the addressee is aware that the speaker is both-
ered by the situation but she won’t accept that she has to do something 
about it). 
(iii) Disagree with the speaker as to the semantic (i.e. constructional) and 
pragmatic implications of his message (i.e. the addressee does not be-
lieve the speaker is bothered by the child’s potential mischief and there-
fore doesn’t feel she should do anything about it). 
There is a fourth theoretical possibility that the addressee disagrees with the 
speaker as to the semantic but not the pragmatic implications of the message. 
However, in practice this possibility is cancelled out by overriding pragmatic 
factors: if the addressee accepts that she has to do something about a negative 
situation, it is because she already agrees that there is such a situation.  
If the foregoing account is correct, the general patterns of probably all dis-
course activity are predictable on the basis of semantic and pragmatic principles. 
This means that in order to understand discourse we need to have a thorough 
understanding of semantics and pragmatics. In this connection, it is our purpose 
to give an account of (i) how semantics and pragmatics interrelate; (ii) how such 
an interrelation affects discourse. In attaining these goals, we will be able to find 
out to what extent discourse principles and strategies are grounded in semantics 
and in pragmatics. 
3. A note on methodology 
As has just been noted above, our main goal is to explore, as systematically as 
possible, the semantic and pragmatic grounding of discourse activity. Our initial 
hypothesis in this connection is that in order to understand discourse activity it is 
necessary to understand not only the rich complexities of the structure of con-
cepts (e.g. the principles of cognitive model theory) but also how this structure 
is exploited to make inferences.
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This being the case, our first step will be to find the kind of approach to se-
mantics and pragmatics that best suits our purposes. Some of the requirements 
of the approach to semantics that we are looking for are the following: (i) it has 
to be able to capture not only form-meaning relationships (such issues as ho-
monymy and polysemy), but also how such relationships are handled by speak-
ers to create conceptual relationships that capture the connectivity of texts; (ii) it 
has to be sensitive to such issues as the centrality of semantic characterizations 
(some attributes of concepts which are peripheral may have a role in creating 
discourse ties); (ii) it has to be broad enough to cover all forms of conceptual 
representation linked to linguistic expressions (e.g. conventional metaphor and 
metonymy) to the extent that such characterizations play a role in generating in-
ferences. The details of these requirements will be dealt with in the following 
section.
With respect to pragmatics, we will favour an approach that sees meaning 
derivation as a matter of interpretation rather than decoding. This pragmatic ap-
proach will have to be largely compatible with the requirements that have been 
set up above for semantics. Where there is no compatibility between the two 
theories, this may require modifications in some of their postulates. 
The second step will be to explore various levels of discourse activity where 
semantics and pragmatics play a significant role. For semantics, cognitive model 
theory, as originally expounded by Lakoff (1987), provides us with the most 
relevant levels of cognitive modelling with an impact on inferential activity: 
frame structure, metaphor, and metonymy will thus be examined is some detail. 
Johnson’s image schemas (cf. Johnson, 1987), which are also regarded as a form 
of idealized cognitive model by Lakoff, will not be discussed since they are 
hardly likely to occur in non-metaphorical characterizations. Image schemas are 
abstract spatial (or topological) representations such as the notions of movement 
along a path, three-dimensional bounded regions (so-called containers), part-
whole relations, and orientations like up and down, front and back, and left and 
right. There are other image schemas in Johnson’s account, such as balance, cir-
cle, compulsion, blockage, centre-periphery, etc. They are used metaphorically 
in many expressions. For example, in I’m in a good mood, the abstract notion of 
‘good mood’ is understood in terms of a bounded region in space where the 
speaker (or protagonist) is located; in We are moving ahead, progress is seen as 
forward movement along a path; in Prices are going up quantity is seen in terms 
of height (up-down schema); the expression I’m scattered  (Lakoff, 1996) makes 
use of the part-whole schema to indicate some loss of intellectual functionality 
(in the same way as divided objects lose functionality).
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For pragmatics, there are two crucial theoretical constructs that will allow us 
to look into how discourse is strategically managed. First, we have the two crite-
ria of relevance (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1995): cognitive economy (i.e. econ-
omy of processing effort) and contextual effects (i.e. the impact on the ad-
dressee’s mental context or cognitive environment). These criteria are expected 
to help us understand how conceptual structure is selected in terms of the bal-
ance between economy and effect (only relevant structure will be brought to 
bear upon some interpretation operations). Second, we have the balance between 
explicit and implicit information, which is expected to lie at the basis of some 
discourse strategies, since much of discourse activity has to do with the degree 
of explicitness of utterances. 
The third and final step will consist in the study of the principles and strate-
gies that follow naturally from looking into the semantic and pragmatic ground-
ing of discourse phenomena. Since the distinction between cohesion and coher-
ence is crucial to understanding how text is constructed, much of our enquiry 
will be focussed upon these notions. 
4. Applications
4.1. Semantics and discourse
There are many ways of doing semantics. We have formal semantics, which 
makes use of principles of logic in looking at concepts in terms of classes of 
items subject to logical operations and definable in terms of intensional and ex-
tensional meaning. We have interpretive semantics, in which lexical items can 
be arranged according to their capability to combine with one another on the ba-
sis of selection restrictions (e.g. such atomic concepts as +/- human, +/-living, 
etc.). There are also paradigmatic approaches like Coseriu’s lexematics whereby 
lexical items are arranged onomasiologically according to their inherent semasi-
ological structure (cf. Faber and Mairal 1999). Other approaches, like Wierz-
bicka’s (1996) analysis and the cognitive semantics approach come closer to 
providing rich semantic characterizations for each lexical item or for the concep-
tual constructs associated with them. Wierzbicka believes that the essentials of 
world knowledge can be captured in definitions by means of a set of universal, 
atomic concepts that she calls “semantic primitives” (e.g. small, big, kind, good, 
do, etc.). Cognitive semantics has taken two forms: idealized cognitive models 
theory (Lakoff, 1987), and frame semantics (Fillmore & Atkins, 1992, 1994). In 
cognitive semantics concepts are complex structures consisting of a number of 
elements and their associated roles (e.g. in a buying frame, we have a buyer, a 
seller, a market, merchandise, and money).  
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It is possible to divide all these different ways of dealing with semantics into 
two basic approaches: one, we will call the minimalist view, and the other the 
maximalist view. Only cognitive semantics fits the latter category, since it tries 
to capture all the complexities of conceptual organization. We will argue that, 
precisely because of these ambitious goals, only a maximalist approach can be 
productively used to account for discourse activity. 
Let us consider Lakoff’s account of the notion of mother (Lakoff, 1987). By 
way of contrast, we will start by providing Wierzbicka’s definition of the same 
concept as created on the basis of her set of primitive universals (Wierzbicka, 
1996: 154-155): 
X is Y’s mother. = 
(a) at one time, before now, X was very small 
(b) at that time, Y was inside X
(c) at that time, Y was like a part of X
(d) because of this, people can think something like this about X:
 “X wants to do good things for Y
X doesn’t want bad things to happen to Y”.
Wierzbicka’s definition, although apparently strange, has the value of being 
couched in terms of (primitive) universal notions like ‘at one time’, ‘before’, 
‘now’, ‘part of’, ‘small’, ‘inside’, ‘good’, and others. It provides us with a way 
to identify the notion of the relation mother-child without making direct use of 
non-universal concepts like ‘birth’ or ‘taking care of’. However, the definition, 
as it stands, misses a lot of the richness of what we know about mothers, as evi-
denced by a number of extensions of the concept: ‘surrogate mother’ (i.e. a 
woman that gives birth to a baby on behalf of another woman), ‘biological 
mother’, ‘foster mother’, ‘adoptive mother’, ‘stepmother’, etc. While biological 
mothers and surrogate mothers carried their babies inside their wombs, foster 
mothers and adoptive mothers only take care of them. Still, in a sense the differ-
ent kinds of mother are mothers, although they do not comply with all the as-
pects of the definition. A surrogate mother bears a baby, but there is no reason 
why she should want good things to happen to the baby just because at one time 
the baby was inside her. However, a foster mother, who has not had the baby in-
side her, is expected to love and care for her child.
A maximalist approach also takes into account metaphorical and metonymic 
uses of concepts. For Lakoff (1987, 1993) a metaphor is a set of correspon-
dences (what he calls a conceptual mapping) between two discrete conceptual 
domains: one of them, called the source, allows us to understand and reason 
about the other called the target. Thus, in ARGUMENT IS WAR we see people 
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arguing as contenders in a battle who plan tactics, attack, defend, counterattack, 
gain or lose ground, and finally win or lose (e.g. She had been gaining ground 
throughout the debate, but then she faltered and her opponent was able to beat 
her). A metonymy is considered a domain-internal conceptual mapping, as in 
She loves Plato, where Plato stands for Plato’s work. 
Now consider these sentences: 
(13) (a) My wife mothers me. 
(b) She mothers her children well. 
(c) Necessity is the mother of invention. 
(d) Spanish is my mother tongue. 
(e) My mother is not married to my father. 
(f) She’s my grandmother on my mother’s side. 
Sentences (13.a) and (13.b) are based upon the idea that mothers take care of 
their children. The difference is that (13.a) is a metaphorical use of the notion 
whereas (13.b) is a literal use. In fact, in (13.b) it is taken for granted that the 
protagonist is the biological mother of the children that she takes care of (on 
some interpretations, there is the possibility that she is not the biological 
mother). In (13.c) the idea that mothers give birth to children is used metaphori-
cally to help us reason about the relationship between necessity and invention 
(necessity is at the origin of invention). In (13.d), the mother tongue is the lan-
guage that you learn from your mother as a native speaker: again there is a 
metaphor that exploits the birth connection between mother and child. In sen-
tence (13.e) the speaker seems to take for granted that most people think that 
children are usually born within the bonds of marriage and it is in this context 
that his remark makes sense. Finally, (13.f) calls upon the idea that one’s mother 
is the closest female ancestor.
The full meaning impact of all these sentences can only be accounted for on 
the basis of a richer description of motherhood than the one provided by a 
minimalist analysis. A maximalist analysis, like the one provided by Lakoff 
(1987), postulates at least five cognitive structures that seem to cluster in our 
minds to account for all aspects of our understanding of the notion of mother: 
the birth model (cf. biological mother, mother tongue, Necessity is the mother of 
invention), the nurturance model (cf. adoptive mother, foster mother, She moth-
ers me), the marital model (My mother is not married to my father), the biologi-
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cal model (cf. surrogate mother), and the genealogical model (cf. She’s my 
grandmother on my mother’s side). What is more, there are important pragmat-
ics and discourse consequences of this form of maximalist analysis. Take the 
following extensions of the previous examples: 
(13’) (a)  My wife mothers me; in fact, she spoils me and I just love that! 
(b) She mothers her children well; while she prepares their meals, she 
bathes and puts them to bed. 
(c) Necessity is the mother of invention, and, as everybody knows, a  
skinny woman named Poverty is the mother of Necessity. 
(d) Spanish is my mother tongue but for me English is like a mother 
tongue too. 
(e) My mother is not married to my father, but I don’t care much. 
(f) She’s my grandmother on my mother’s side, but in my mind she’s 
closer to me than my own mother. 
Mothers in taking care of their children often give them everything they ask for. 
This is generally regarded as negative since children also need discipline (note 
that mothering well is incompatible with spoiling a child); but this negative as-
sociation does not carry over to the metaphorical extension (13’.a), since in the 
context of adults the discipline element is not present. Example (13’.b) makes 
some relevant connections with the standard notion of mothering a child well. 
However, note the impossibility of: 
(13’’.b) She mothers her children well; in fact she spoils them! 
Explaining why (13’.b) is possible while (13’’.b) is not requires a maximalist 
account in which genuine motherhood is connected not only to nurturance but 
also to the discipline of children. This apparently trivial aspect of the semantic 
organization of linguistic expressions, i.e. that metaphorical extensions of con-
cepts only make use of partial conceptual structure for the metaphoric source, 
has important discourse consequences in terms of an account of the discourse 
potential of expressions. This is a semantic principle, which we will call the 
First Principle of Metaphoric Source Selection; as will be seen below, it is com-
plementary of another principle that regulates source selection in the case of 
cluster models. 
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Example (13’.c) is based, just like (13.c), on the birth model to the extent that 
physical birth can be made to correspond to (non-physical) origin. In it, we have 
a conceptual association between necessity and poverty (the poor are people in 
need), which makes the discourse extension possible. Note, however, that while 
we can say that poverty is at the origin of necessity and necessity at the origin of 
invention, a metaphor like the following would be odd, to say the least: 
(13’’.c) ??Poverty is the grandmother of invention. 
The reason for this is that (13’’.c) makes use of a different cognitive model from 
the cluster, i.e. the genealogical model (cf. Frieda is Mary’s mother; Mary is 
Jane’s mother; therefore Frieda is Jane’s grandmother), while (13.c) and (13’.c) 
exploit the birth model (the idea of birth maps onto the idea of origin). The 
structure of the relationship between the notions of poverty, necessity and inven-
tion cannot enter into transitivity relationships; that is why the genealogical 
model may not apply. As a general principle, which will be explained in greater 
detail below, a metaphor may never override the logical structure of the concept 
to which it applies. This semantic principle places an important constraint on 
discourse activity: only literal uses of concepts may make use of all the models 
in a cluster in order to create discourse coherence; metaphorical extensions may 
only exploit one of the models in a cluster. This is the Second Principle of 
Metaphoric Source Selection.
Cognitive semantics has only identified one principle of metaphor production, 
called the Invariance Principle (Lakoff, 1990, 1993). This principle tells us that 
the (general topological) structure of the target domain (i.e. the tenor) of a meta-
phoric mapping has to be preserved in a way that is consistent with the structure 
of the source. In the case of a mapping from an animal to a person, the head will 
map onto the head, the body onto the body and the legs onto the legs. Non-
corresponding structure from a topological perspective may not be mapped (we 
do not map tops onto bottoms). However, this principle focuses on the nature of 
correspondences. The principles of source selection focus on what elements of a 
cognitive model may be used as a metaphoric source. 
Sentence (13’.d) illustrates not a semantic but a discourse principle that is 
firmly rooted in semantics. The statement that English is “like a mother tongue” 
for the speaker suggests that the speaker has an emotional attachment to English 
similar to the one people have with respect to their true mother tongues. Strictly 
speaking, a person’s mother tongue is the language that that person has learned 
as a child from his parents. However, in a maximalist approach to semantics 
there is much more that we know about the notion of ‘mother tongue’: the 
mother tongue is usually mastered better that other languages learned at later 
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stages in life; people usually feel more comfortable (both emotionally and in 
terms of fluency) when they use their mother tongues. It is this knowledge, 
rather than the minimalist definition, that is used in the interpretation of (13’.d). 
This happens because of the application of the pragmatic Principle of Relevance 
(cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995): since English cannot be the speaker’s mother 
tongue in the strict sense of being the language that he learned as a child from 
his parents, then it is necessary to look into all other elements of the notion and 
find those that may be relevant. So (13’.d) is meaningful from a discourse 
standpoint because the central characterization of ‘mother tongue’ is discarded 
to the benefit of more peripheral features. We may call this the Peripherality 
Principle: if the most central characterization of a concept fails to make sense in 
discourse, the speaker, in an effort to achieve coherence, will look for the first 
non-central feature that satisfies the conditions of relevance (i.e. providing a sat-
isfactory a meaningful set of contextual effects for the least processing effort). 
Example (13’.e), in the same way as (13.e) above, makes use of the marital 
model whereby the mother is typically married to the father. However, in order 
to understand (13’.e) the addressee needs to have access to more information 
than this, in particular to the idea that having children without being married 
may not be socially sanctioned. The speaker’s remark that he does not care 
much addresses this part of his world knowledge about social conventions. 
Again, coherence is achieved on the basis of peripheral information about one of 
the models in the cluster. 
Finally, (13’.f) is based upon the genealogical model, like (13.f), but it ex-
ploits the model discursively in a significantly different manner. The expression 
in my mind opens up an alternative mental frame, where conditions are different 
from those in the initial cognitive model. Fauconnier (1985) has termed such al-
ternative cognitive structures mental spaces and linguistic expressions that call 
for the creation of mental spaces space builders. Here are some examples, where 
in the picture, John believes, and in his story have the function of introducing al-
ternative mental spaces: 
(14) (a) In the picture, the girl with blue eyes has green eyes. 
(b) John believes that the girl with blue eyes has green eyes. 
(c) In his story, the girl with blue eyes has green eyes. 
A mental space thus created presents us with figurative, even impossible reality, 
as is the case with counterfactual statements: 
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(14) (d) If I were a young woman, I would dye my hair red. 
In the mental space created by the speaker in (13’.f) his grandmother is figura-
tively closer to him than his own mother. However, ‘closeness’ in this example 
is different from closeness within the genealogical model of mother-child rela-
tionships. Since we know that the speaker cannot be closer to his grandmother 
than to his mother in terms of the number of generations that separates them, the 
Peripherality Principle will lead us to look for a different interpretation of close,
in this case in terms of affection. Affection and closeness correlate experien-
tially: people who have affection for each other have greater physical contact 
than strangers. Thus, emotional intimacy is often seen as physical closeness, as 
evidenced by metaphorical expressions like I feel very close to her, He always 
distances himself from me, We are closer than ever before, They have developed 
an attachment, We are drifting apart, He won’t let me get near him, and many 
others.
So what is really interesting about example (13’.f) in terms of the Peripheral-
ity Principle is that we have two different metaphorical interpretations of close:
one applies to the central characterization of generational relationships within 
the genealogical model (i.e. ‘close’ in terms of the number of generations be-
tween two relatives); the other applies to the non-central characterization of 
emotional relationships within the same model. Children feel naturally closer to 
their parents (who usually take care of them on a constant basis) than to their 
grandparents. It is this non-central part of the genealogical model that is ad-
dressed by the speaker in (13’.f). In terms of the discourse potential of linguistic 
expressions we learn that a peripheral feature of a concept may be accessed on 
the basis of metaphor and that this requires the creation of an alternative mental 
space where the metaphorical extension may make sense. 
The study of metonymy is also part of the maximalist approach to meaning to 
the extent that it is possible to argue that metonymic connections are part of our 
conventionalized knowledge of the world. Think of the metonymic association 
between hands and labourers (We need two more hands here), instruments and 
players (The piano has the flue), customers and orders (The ham sandwich is 
waiting for his bill), authors and their works (I like Shakespeare), a controlling 
entity for the entity that is controlled (e.g. The buses are on strike), and actors 
and their roles (Hamlet was superb last night), among many others.  
One of the main concerns of cognitive linguists working on metonymy has 
been to provide clear definitional and typological criteria which separate meton-
ymy from metaphor and from literal uses of language (cf. Barcelona 2000; Ruiz 
de Mendoza 2000). More recently, some work has been devoted to the connec-
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tion between metonymy and pragmatic inferencing (cf. the collection of papers 
in Panther and Thornburg 2003). There now follow some of the crucial findings 
in these studies. 
 Metonymy is a pervasive phenomenon in language that goes beyond cases of 
referential shifts commonly attested the literature (e.g. ORDER FOR CUS-
TOMER, INSTRUMENT FOR PLAYER, CONTROLLER FOR CON-
TROLLED, etc.). Thus, it is proposed that there are several kinds of non-
referential metonymy: (i) predicative metonymies like Mary is just a pretty face 
(meaning ‘Mary has a beautiful face’ and implying that her beauty is her only 
relevant attribute to the exclusion of others like intelligence; cf. Ruiz de Men-
doza, 2000); (ii) propositional metonymies like She waved down a taxi (meaning 
that she stopped a taxi by waving at it) (cf. Lakoff, 1987); (iii) illocutionary me-
tonymies (e.g. I can buy you a bicycle, where the speaker’s ability to buy an 
item stands for his guarantee that he will buy the item; cf. similar proposals in 
Thornburg and Panther 1997; Panther and Thornburg 1998); (iv) and situational 
metonymies (e.g. The poor dog left with its tail between its legs, where part of a 
conventional scenario stands for the full scenario in which the dog is beaten and 
probably humiliated in such a way that the animal has to leave to avoid further 
harm; cf. Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal 2002).  
 Kövecses and Radden (1998) introduce for the first time the notion of high-
level metonymy, where both source and target are generic cognitive models (e.g. 
INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION as in He hammered a nail into the wall). Ruiz de 
Mendoza and Pérez (2001), and Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal (2002) have studied 
the full semantic import of many grammatical phenomena on the basis of possi-
ble underlying high-level metonymies. Thus, it is possible to explain some 
asymmetries in the use of resultative predicates on the grounds of the semantic 
constraints imposed by high-level metonymic mappings. Consider the applica-
tion of the high-level metonymy RESULT FOR ACTION (first identified by 
Panther and Thornburg 2000) to account for the infelicity of *Fall asleep versus
Don’t fall asleep. The difference in meaning between the two sentences (and 
their degree of felicity) is evident from the following respective paraphrases 
based upon the proposed metonymy: ‘act in such a way that as a result you will 
fall asleep’ (which is hardly feasible), and ‘act in such a way that as a result you 
won’t fall asleep’. It is also possible to find a metonymic motivation for such 
phenomena as the subcategorial conversion of nouns (e.g. There were three 
Johns at the party, ENTITY FOR COLLECTION), the recategorization of ad-
jectives (e.g. blacks, nobles, PROPERTY FOR ENTITY), and modality shifts 
(POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY, as in I can see the mountain from my 
window, where I can see means ‘I actually see because the conditions allow me 
to see’). 
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 Metonymy interacts with metaphor in significant ways. Goossens (1990) was 
the first cognitive linguist to address this issue in his article Metaphtonymy.
However, he used limited evidence coming from a small body-part corpus and 
his findings have only partial value. Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez (2002) have 
provided the most detailed and systematic account of interaction patterns in 
which metonymy plays a role. Their proposal is based upon the formal distinc-
tion between two basic metonymy types and the conceptual operations which 
hinge upon them. In Nixon bombed Hanoi, Nixon stands for the United States air 
force under his command, a subdomain of ‘Nixon’; this is a case where the 
metonymic target is a subdomain of the source, or a target-in-source metonymy. 
In The ham sandwich is waiting for his bill, the order is a subdomain of the cus-
tomer who has placed the order; this is a source-in-target metonymy. In the first 
case, we have a cognitive operation of reduction of the amount of conceptual 
material that is needed to find the right referent for the expression (since the ac-
tual referent is a subdomain of the source, the target is conceptually smaller for 
the purposes of the metonymic operation). In the second case we have an opera-
tion of conceptual expansion (the source gives us access to a conceptually richer 
target). Within the framework of a metaphoric mapping, Ruiz de Mendoza and 
Díez (2002) postulate that metonymy plays a subsidiary role. It may either ex-
pand or reduce the metaphoric source or the metaphoric target. 
 These examples will illustrate the four patterns (there are of course a number 
of subpatterns, since the reduction operation may work on the whole source and 
target or on just part of it): 
Metonymic expansion of the metaphoric source: He beat his breast, uttered in 
a situation in which the protagonist has not actually beaten his breast. The 
source has the underspecified situation in which a person beats his breast as 
an open show of sorrow about something wrong that he has done. 
Metonymic reduction of the metaphoric source: She’s my soul, where ‘soul’ 
stands for a subdomain of ‘soul’, i.e. ‘the essence of my existence’, in the 
metaphoric source. The target has the person that we are talking about. 
Metonymic expansion of the metaphoric target: She caught my ear, where 
‘ear’ in the metaphoric target is the instrument of hearing that stands for ‘at-
tention’; catching an object is a way of getting hold of it and maps onto the 
idea of obtaining someone’s attention. 
Metonymic reduction of the metaphoric target: She won my heart, where 
‘heart’ stands for a cultural subdomain of heart, i.e. ‘love’. The source has a 
J e z i k o s l o v l j e  
8 . 2  ( 2 0 0 7 ) :  1 1 5 - 1 6 7 135
person that wins a prize while the target has a lover that obtains someone’s 
love.
What is missing in current research on metonymy is the study of the discourse 
potential of metonymic activity. The reason for this is to be found, in all likeli-
hood, in the still dominant idea that metonymy is simply a local cognitive phe-
nomenon, of a mainly referential nature. However, the evidence suggests, as 
pointed out above, that metonymy is pervasive in much of our cognitive activity. 
Thus, it may underlie the generation of conversational implicatures and the in-
terpretation of indirect speech acts (Ruiz de Mendoza 2007): 
(15) (a) How did you go to the airport? - I stopped a taxi. 
(b) It’s getting colder here [addressee closes an open window] 
In (15.a) the answer I stopped a taxi does not fully address the first speaker’s 
question. But we know that it is part of a conventional scenario (or idealized 
cognitive model) pertaining to the use of taxi services: within that scenario, 
stopping a taxi is a precondition to take the taxi and ask the driver to take you to 
your destination. From the point of view of metonymy, the act of stopping a taxi 
provides us with a point of access to the whole scenario, in such a way that the 
person asking the question may reason: 
[1] ‘If he stopped a taxi, this means he took a taxi and he gave the driver 
instructions to take him to the airport; so, he took a taxi to go there’ 
In (15.b) we also have a conventional scenario that differs in quality from the 
one specified for (15.a). In effect, what we have in (15.b) is an action scenario 
based upon what Leech (1983) called the pragmatic cost-benefit scale, i.e. the 
idea that, because of accepted social norms, we are required to minimize cost 
and maximize benefit for others while maximizing cost and minimizing cost to 
selves (cf. Pérez and Ruiz de Mendoza 2002, Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi 
2007). In the context of that action scenario, the addressee of an utterance like 
(15.b), which seems to point to the speaker’s discomfort, is expected to do all he 
can to change the situation to the speaker’s benefit. What speech act theorists 
call the “illocutionary force” of this utterance is ultimately calculated on the ba-
sis of a metonymic operation whereby part of an action scenario stands for the 
whole of it. The reasoning process may take the following form: 
[2] ‘If the speaker makes a remark about a costly state of affairs that af-
fects him negatively, this means that he wants to draw my attention to 
such a state of affairs so that I have the opportunity to act in such a 
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way that cost to the speaker is minimized even if I have to maximize 
cost to myself; since I think it is an open window that makes him feel 
cold, the speaker expects me to close the window for him’ 
Gricean pragmaticists, (cf. Bach and Harnish, 1979; Grice, 1989) would ad-
dress the problem of the inferential process used by the first speaker in (15.a) by 
postulating a pragmatic principle or maxim that regulates the process and pro-
duces an implicature. In this case, the maxim of relation (“be relevant”) would 
apply and direct the addressee to look for a relevant answer connected to the in-
formation explicitly given.  
Neo-Gricean pragmaticists, like Levinson (2000) would deal with this impli-
cature-derivation process on the basis of some sort of conventional heuristics 
that is part of our reasoning equipment. More specifically, Levinson (2000: 31-
35) proposes three heuristics (i.e. reasoning systems) that lie at the basis of im-
plicated meaning: 
(i)  First heuristic: “What isn’t said, isn’t”; e.g. in There is a blue pyramid 
on the red cube, this heuristic licenses inferences like these: ‘There is 
not a cone on the red cube’; ‘There is not a red pyramid on the red 
cube’.
(ii) Second heuristic: “What is simply described is stereotypically exem-
plified”; e.g. in The blue pyramid is on the red cube, this heuristic li-
censes inferences like the following: ‘The pyramid is a stereotypical 
one, on a square, rather than, e.g., a hexagonal base’; ‘The pyramid is 
directly supported by the cube (e.g. there is no intervening slab)’; ‘The 
pyramid is centrally placed on, or properly supported by, the cube (it 
is not teetering on the edge, etc.)’; ‘The pyramid is in canonical posi-
tion, resting on its base, and not balanced, e.g. on its apex’.
(iii) Third heuristic: “What is said in an abnormal way, isn’t normal; or 
marked message indicates marked situation”; e.g. in The blue cuboid 
block is supported by the red cube, this heuristic licenses the infer-
ences: ‘The blue block is not, strictly, a cube’; ‘The blue block is not 
directly or centrally or stably supported by the red cube’. 
Examples like (15.a) and (15.b) above would seem to be explainable by the third 
heuristic, since they are marked messages that call for a special interpretation 
procedure.
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Relevance theorists, following Sperber and Wilson (1995), would account for 
(15.a) and (15.b) in a different way. For them, the answer I stopped a taxi is 
meaningful in context provided that the second speaker has the intention of put-
ting particular emphasis on the fact that he had to take a taxi. There may be a 
number of reasons. Imagine a context in which the speaker would have preferred 
to be given a lift by a friend and felt frustrated that he had been turned down. 
The sentence I stopped a taxi is more meaningful (i.e. it creates a broader range 
of what Sperber and Wilson call “contextual effects” in the addressee’s mind) in 
this context than simply stating the less marked form “I went by taxi”. In Rele-
vance Theory it is taken for granted that when we communicate we try to strike 
a balance between processing economy and contextual effects (i.e. modifications 
of the addressee’s cognitive environment by adding, taking away or changing 
the information that is manifest to him). An utterance like I stopped a taxi re-
quires greater inferential activity than the more straightforward I went by taxi;
the greater effort involved has to be compensated by extra contextual effects. 
Even this brief account of the Gricean and post-Gricean standard explanations 
of inference reveals one fundamental problem: the three accounts are capable of 
accounting for the outcome of inferential activity, but have nothing to say about 
the nature of such an activity. Thus, in all cases we know (because a conversa-
tional maxim is violated, or because there is a conventional heuristic, or because 
the speaker tries to achieve relevance) that we have to engage in special inter-
pretative procedures when faced with examples such as (15.a) and (15.a), but we 
are not told what those procedures are like. We suggest that metonymic map-
pings, like those postulated by cognitive linguists, are a clear case of such pro-
cedures.
This proposal is consonant with another previous proposal made by Ruiz de 
Mendoza and Pérez (2003) in the sense that metaphor and metonymy are to be 
listed among the cognitive mechanisms used by speakers to produce explica-
tures. In standard Relevance Theory, it is postulated that explicatures are derived 
on the basis of the development of the initial assumption schema provided by 
the utterance. Thus, in We are ready, finding a referent for we (e.g. ‘my brother 
and I’) and completing the utterance to specify what it is that the protagonists 
are ready for (e.g. ‘for the show’), is part of the explicature-derivation activity. 
Implicatures, on the other hand, require more complex reasoning schemas with 
implicit premises and implicated conclusions, as in the following exchange ut-
tered in the context of a party: 
(16) What time is it? - Most of the guests are leaving now. 
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The answer to the first speaker’s question is relevant only if we bring into the 
reasoning schema the implicit assumption that guests will leave when they feel 
that it is getting too late for them or they have had enough. The conclusion is 
that it is time to finish the event.  
Ruiz de Mendoza and Pérez (2003) have argued that metaphoric and meto-
nymic mappings produce explicatures based on the blueprint provided by the 
linguistic expression. Thus, the shift from ‘shoe’ to ‘shoelaces’ in He didn’t tie 
his shoes well, would be a development of the initial assumption schema pro-
vided by the expression and would not need to import implicit premises from the 
context to fill in a reasoning schema.
However, in our proposal, even implicature-derivation is a matter of meton-
ymy. The difference is that the metonymy is not of the referential kind, but sim-
ply a situational metonymy. In the case of reasoning schema [1], it is a low-level 
situational metonymy, based on a specific scenario with specific conventional 
information about taking taxis. However, in the case of [2] we have a high-level 
situational metonymy based on a generic action scenario, i.e. the result of ab-
stracting away common structure from many situations in which speakers are di-
rected (requested, order, suggested, etc.) to do things (cf. Pérez and Ruiz de 
Mendoza 2002, Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi 2007).
Understanding metonymy is also crucial in order to explain some phenomena 
of discourse cohesion. It may be useful to consider the GENERIC FOR SPE-
CIFIC and the EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymies, which have been identified 
by Panther and Thornburg (2000) as a high-level metonymies with an impact on 
English grammar. Compare: 
(17)
(a)
A: What’s that bird? 
B: It’s a robin. 
(b)
A: What’s that noise? 
B: It’s a burglar. 
As Panther and Thornburg (2000) point out, the What’s that N? construction, 
when used metonymically, has two senses, the taxonomic, as in example (17.a), 
and the causal, as in (17.b). The taxonomic sense is regulated by the metonymy 
GENERIC IS SPECIFIC: this allows us to paraphrase A’s utterance in (17.a) as 
‘What kind of bird is that?’ The causal sense has a metonymic grounding in the 
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EFFECT FOR CAUSE mapping, which yields a different kind of paraphrase for 
A’s utterance in (17.b): ‘What’s the cause of that noise?’. Panther and Thorn-
burg note that while the English grammar makes it possible to repeat the Noun 
Phrase instead of making use of the anaphoric pronoun in (17.a), this is not the 
case for (17.b), and correlate this difference in grammatical behaviour with the 
difference in the underlying metonymic mappings: 
(18) (a) That bird is a robin. 
(b) *That noise is a burglar. 
To Panther and Thornburg’s account, it is possible to add one more observation 
in terms of discourse connectivity. Cohesion has often been treated as a gram-
matical phenomenon, in contrast to coherence that was based on world knowl-
edge (e.g. frames) and was therefore purely conceptual. However, the fact that 
anaphora, one of the procedures to create cohesion (Halliday and Hasan, 1976, 
1989), may depend on metonymic activation, seems to point to a different treat-
ment of the issue, one in which cohesion is seen as being conceptually grounded 
(cf. Minsky, 1975; Reinhart, 1980). This may apply to all other cases of anaph-
ora:
(19) I love my family. They do all they can for me. 
It is very well known that singular words that refer to groups of people (e.g. po-
lice, family, government, team) can often be used as if they were plural. They 
can also be used in the singular form, depending on how we want to think of 
them. Note that using the singular anaphoric pronoun in (19’) would not be as 
appropriate:
 (19’) I love my family. ?It does all it can for me. 
However, the singular form is better on other occasions: 
(20) My family is great (cf. ?My family are great) 
There is a relationship between the foregoing discussion and one crucial finding 
in the context of what has been called metonymic anaphora (e.g. Stirling, 1996), 
i.e. anaphoric reference to a metonymic noun phrase. The finding was first made 
by Ruiz de Mendoza (2000) and has been considerably refined in Ruiz de Men-
doza and Otal (2002) and in Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez (2004). It is the fact that 
anaphoric reference to a metonymic noun phrase always makes use of the matrix 
(or most encompassing) domain of the metonymic mapping. Ruiz de Mendoza 
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and Otal (2002) have coined the label Domain Availability Principle (or DAP) 
to capture this idea: only the matrix domain of a metonymic mapping is avail-
able for anaphoric reference. 
The issue of anaphora in connection to metonymy was first raised by Faucon-
nier (1985) and Nunberg (1995) who give partial answers to the problem. Thus, 
Fauconnier believes that there is a pragmatic function that connects a meto-
nymic source and its corresponding target, and that anaphora usually selects the 
metonymic target (i.e. the intended mental representation), especially if the tar-
get is animate (e.g. in The ham sandwich is waiting for his bill, the target is ani-
mate and would be selected as the antecedent for an anaphoric pronoun, as in 
The ham sandwich is waiting for his bill and he is getting restless). If the source 
is animate, then it serves as the antecedent (e.g. ‘Napoleon’, rather than ‘Napo-
leon’s navy’, is the antecedent in After Napoleon lost at Waterloo, he was ban-
ished to St. Helena). However, this analysis is incapable of determining the po-
tential antecedent when both source and target are either animate or inanimate: 
(21) Terminator (i.e. Arnold Schwarzenegger) has just been elected governor 
of California. Will he be up to the job?
(22) I love the book (i.e. its contents). I’ll read it a second time. 
Nunberg (1995) tries to come to terms with the issue of metonymic anaphora by 
making a distinction between two different types of linguistic mechanism: “de-
ferred indexical reference” and “predicate transfer”. The former is the process 
by means of which an indexical is used to refer to an object that corresponds 
somehow to the contextual element chosen by a demonstrative. The latter occurs 
whenever the name of a property that applies to something in one domain is 
used to refer to the name of a property that applies to things in another domain 
(Nunberg 1995: 111). He gives the following examples: 
(23) (a) This is parked out back. 
(b) I am parked out back. 
The two sentences are produced while the speaker is holding out a key. Sentence 
(23.a) is a case of deferred indexical reference, where the demonstrative pro-
noun this is used to refer to a car. Sentence (23.b) illustrates predicate transfer 
since a property of cars (i.e. cars may be parked) is attributed to a person. Ac-
cording to Nunberg, the distinction between deferred indexical reference and 
predicate transfers is enough to explain cases of metonymic anaphora: 
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(24) (a) This is parked out back and may not start. 
(b) ??This only fits the left front door and is parked out back. 
(c) I am parked out back and have been waiting for 15 minutes. 
(d) *I am parked out back and may not start. 
In deferred indexical reference, a conjoined predicate must be semantically con-
nected to the deferred referent, like ‘the car’ in (24.a), whereas in predicate 
transfer the conjoined predicate must express a property of the element that re-
ceives the property, i.e. the driver/owner in (24.c). However, this account cannot 
be applied to all cases of metonymic anaphora. The main problems lie with the 
notion of predicate transfer: 
(25) (a) Shakespeare (i.e. a book by Shakespeare) is right there on the top 
shelf. Could you please hand it over to me? 
(b) The kettle (i.e. the contents; the water in the kettle) is boiling; 
please, turn it off.
In (25.a) we have a case of what Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal (2002) have called 
double metonymy, AUTHOR FOR WORKS FOR MEDIUM, where AUTHOR 
and MEDIUM are matrix domains, so it in (25.b) refers back to the medium of 
presentation of Shakespeare’s works (e.g. a book). It must be borne in mind that 
semantic compatibility between the metonymy and the predicate of the expres-
sion is what makes us select the second and not the first matrix domain for the 
anaphoric operation (cf. Shakespeare is on the top shelf; I would read him/it if I 
were you, where him has the matrix ‘Shakespeare’ as its antecedent, and it the 
book, but in the two cases we mean ‘Shakespeare’s work’). If we wanted to ap-
ply Nunberg’s analysis to (25.a) we would have to postulate a predicate transfer 
whereby a property of books (i.e. being stored on shelves) is applied to Shake-
speare. The adjoined predicate ‘hand over’ would have to express a property of 
Shakespeare, since it is ‘Shakespeare’ that has received the new property. But 
evidently this is not the case. The adjoined predicate expresses a property of 
books (books can be handed over).
In (25.b) the predicate transfer would give the property of ‘boiling’ to the ket-
tle; the adjoined predicate ‘turn off’ would have to express a property of kettles. 
However, it is not kettles but the fire that we use to heat the water that is turned 
on or off.
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The Domain Availability Principle captures all cases of metonymic anaphora. 
In the case of Nunberg’s example This is parked out back and may not start, this
points to an object (the key) that is to be considered a subdomain of the car to 
which it belongs, the car being the matrix domain. In this interpretation, (it) may 
not start makes use of the matrix domain for the anaphoric operation. Note that 
because we have deferred reference, it would be impossible to say  
*This key is parked out back.
The case of I am parked out back and have been waiting for 15 minutes is dif-
ferent. The car is a subdomain of the owner of the car, so we have a metonymy 
from owner to possession, where the matrix domain ‘owner’ is referred to ana-
phorically in the conjoined sentence. 
Example (25.a) is a clear case of the DAP: one of the two matrix domains, i.e. 
the one that combines with the predicate ‘be on the top shelf’ (the medium of 
presentation of Shakespeare’s work) is used for the anaphoric operation.
Finally, (25.b) is a more complex case. In principle, it is the matrix domain 
‘kettle’ that is referred to by it in turn it off. However, when we say turn the ket-
tle off what we mean is turn the heating source off (e.g. the fire). However, the 
concept ‘kettle’ still retains its status as the matrix domain in the case of the 
conceptual association between ‘kettle’ and ‘fire’, so the use of it is appropriate 
and abides by the DAP.
4.2. Pragmatics and discourse
In the previous section, we have made reference to the connection between se-
mantics and discourse in terms of the study of cohesion and coherence. In this 
section, we will consider how achieving cohesion and coherence is influenced 
by pragmatic principles. In fact, our main contention will be that some discourse 
principles pertaining to what is known as cohesion and coherence phenomena 
are grounded in pragmatics. 
Let us first take another linguistic mechanism commonly accepted to be a 
(grammatical) cohesive device, i.e. nominal ellipsis (cf. Halliday and Hasan, 
1976: 150): 
(26) Here are my two white silk scarves.
1. Where are yours? 
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2. I used to have three. 
3. Can you see any black? 
4. Or would you prefer cotton. 
Halliday and Hasan observe that yours presupposes ‘two white silk scarves’; 
three presupposes ‘white silk scarves’; any black presupposes ‘silk scarves’; fi-
nally, cotton only presupposes ‘scarves’. The conclusion is that the range of pos-
sible presuppositions is dependent on the structure of the nominal group (i.e. 
noun phrase): it extends to cover only that part of the presupposed group that 
would follow the Head of the elliptical group. However, consider the following 
related examples: 
(27)  (a) Here are my two white silk scarves. They look very much like 
yours but are yours made of silk too? 
(b) Here are my two white silk scarves. Yours are brown linen scarves, 
aren’t they? 
If yours actually presupposed ‘two white silk scarves’, the extension in (27.a) 
would be incongruent. This is more evident if we consider the following para-
phrase of (27.a): 
(28) ??Here are my two white silk scarves. They look very much like your two 
white silk scarves but are they made of silk too? 
The same can be said of (27.b): 
(29) ??Here are my two white silk scarves. Your two white silk scarves are 
brown linen scarves, aren’t they? 
Actual presupposed meaning, as is well known, may be cancelled out but not in 
the same way. To give an example, the sentence I regret stepping on your toe
presupposes that the speaker stepped on the addressee’s toe. But compare: 
(30) I don’t regret stepping on your toe because I didn’t step on your toe 
Note that it would be impossible to cancel out the purported presupposed mean-
ing of yours (i.e. “your white silk scarves”) by following a similar procedure: 
(31) (a) ??Here are my two white silk scarves. Yours are not white silk 
scarves.
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(b) ??I don’t regret spoiling your white silk scarves because yours are 
not white silk scarves.
What this discussion seems to suggest is that the actual scope of nominal ellipsis 
is not governed by hard-and-fast lexicogrammatical rules, as Halliday and Hasan 
claim. Our own claim is that ellipsis is subject to pragmatic constraints. Thus, 
we propose that yours in the examples above only codes a very generic meaning 
which stems from its pronominal nature, viz. the idea that it substitutes for a 
whole noun phrase whatever its actual make-up. Thus, in (27.a) yours takes the 
place of scarves, while in Where are yours? in (26) yours stands for ‘two white 
silk scarves’, even though we have the same initial description for the two cases 
of ellipsis. What conceptual material is to be supplied is a matter of co-textual 
and contextual requirements. Let us look into example (27.b) above in greater 
detail by considering different discourse developments of it: 
 (32) Here are my two white silk scarves.
(a) Yours (= your scarves) are brown linen scarves, aren’t they? 
(b) Yours (= your two white scarves) are not silk, are they? 
(c) When I saw yours (= your white silk scarves) I though they were 
three.
Between brackets we simply have a default assumption, that is, the most acces-
sible assumption in the absence of a specific context. The context may override 
all or part of a default assumption. For example, (32.b) would still make sense if 
the addressee had three scarves and the speaker was pointing at them with his 
finger. In any case, the interpretation of yours and consequently its scope as a 
nominal ellipsis device, hinges upon the way information is contrasted. Since, as 
Halliday and Hasan (1976: 144) themselves point out, ellipsis is an anaphoric re-
lation, we will refer to the conceptual material within the scope of ellipsis as its 
antecedent. The antecedent, as it were, sets the stage. It supplies all possible 
conceptual material for reference through ellipsis. The rest of the discourse unit 
containing the ellipsis selects, in combination with contextual information, what 
part of the antecedent is to be invoked by providing degrees of contrast with the 
antecedent. We will postulate here a discourse principle, the Conceptual Struc-
ture Selection Principle (CSSP), which is grounded in the pragmatic principle of 
Relevance. The principle has the following formulation: ellipsis or substitution 
mechanisms select as much structure as is not cancelled out by the discourse 
unit containing the ellipsis or substitution. The grounding in relevance is evi-
dent: only relevant conceptual structure is brought to bear upon the referential 
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operation on the antecedent; of course, by "relevant" is meant, in consonance 
with Sperber and Wilson’s approach to communication, meaningful in terms of 
the balance between processing effort and contextual effects. Supplying concep-
tual structure that will not produce the intended quantity or quality of effects is 
contrary to the Principle of Relevance. Thus, in (32.a), yours refers to your
scarves because, in terms of quality, supplying more conceptual material would 
create a semantic contradiction (cf. *Your two white silk scarves are brown linen 
scarves). Similar explanations apply to (32.b) and (32.c), which select material 
from the antecedent differently. In the default interpretation of Here are my two 
white silk scarves. Where are yours?, the whole noun phrase is supplied in terms 
of quantity because less material would not create the exact amount of meaning 
effects sought by the speaker. 
The Conceptual Structure Selection Principle is formulated in such a way that 
it can deal with cases of ellipsis like the ones discussed above, where it is possi-
ble to have various interpretation possibilities, and with more straightforward 
cases like (33) below: 
(33) John brought some sweets, and Mary some chocolates. 
In (33) the ellipsis mechanism can only select the predicate ‘brought’, since the 
rest of the structure (‘some sweets’) is cancelled out by the discourse unit con-
taining the ellipsis in virtue of the way the information is contrasted. Relevance, 
in its turn, predicts that, since sweets and chocolates are the items explicitly 
mentioned and set in contrast, it is the predicate ‘brought’ that will produce the 
intended set of contextual effects. Selection of the adequate predicate is guided 
by the Principle of Relevance. 
Substitution mechanisms abide by the same principles. Consider the follow-
ing case of substitution (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 134): 
  (34) Is this mango ripe? - It seems so. 
Halliday and Hasan point out that the answer It seems so is ambiguous between 
two options: 
(i) The interpretation ‘this mango seems ripe’, where it refers to ‘this 
mango’ and to ‘ripe’. 
(ii) The interpretation ‘it seems that this mango is ripe’, where it is an imper-
sonal non-anaphoric pronoun and so is a clausal substitute. 
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For interpretation (i), the Conceptual Structure Selection Principle works on the 
basis of the assumption that it is a substitution device and ‘seems so’ contrasts 
with the idea of ‘being ripe’ in the first clause. So substitutes for ‘ripe’ on the 
basis of the contrast between ‘this mango seems’ and ‘this mango is’. Interpreta-
tion (ii) only handles this latter contrast (the rest of the structure is cancelled out 
by the contrast). 
Or consider the following more complex examples of clausal substitution: 
(35)  (a) Everyone seems to think he is guilty. If so, no doubt he’ll offer to 
resign.
(b) Everyone seems to think he is guilty. If so, we will have to change 
their minds. 
In (35.a) so only substitutes for ‘he is guilty’, while in (35.b) so is broader in 
scope and refers to the whole first clause (‘everyone seems to think he’s guilty’). 
The clue for the Conceptual Structure Selection Principle to select the correct 
amount of conceptual structure from the first clause is given by the main clause 
in the conditional sequence, since it provided the point of contrast with the rele-
vant parts of the first clause. 
It is necessary to note that there is no grammatical indication either in (35.a) 
or (35.b) of the scope of the substitution device. It follows that substitution, like 
ellipsis, is not a grammatical phenomenon but a discourse phenomenon 
grounded in pragmatics. Contrast between the relevant parts of the clause sup-
plying the antecedent and the clause containing the anaphoric device is based 
upon world knowledge, just like coherence.  
Our discussion in this section keeps pointing to the fundamental role played 
by pragmatic principles, discourse principles, and world knowledge when con-
sidering the question of (textual) cohesion. In the previous section we also iden-
tified some semantic factors, like the existence of metonymic mappings, which 
suggested that cohesion had a strong conceptual grounding. Since coherence is 
also based upon principles of comparable nature and exploits world knowledge, 
it may be legitimate to ask what the difference is, if any, between the two phe-
nomena. One possible answer to the problem would be to discard the cohe-
sion/coherence dichotomy and talk instead of discourse connectivity. However, 
this solution would ignore one crucial question. Some forms of achieving con-
nectivity seem to have greater dependency on the internal configuration of con-
cepts. For example, in the sequence I saw a mouse in the kitchen last night; I 
think I’m going to buy a cat, it is the world knowledge connection between cats 
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and mice that allows us to infer that the speaker is going to use a cat to get rid of 
the mouse. The information that cats chase mice is part of our idealized cogni-
tive models about cats and mice. In contrast, ellipsis or substitution mechanisms, 
although ultimately conceptual, exploit world knowledge differently, as is evi-
dent from examples like (35.a.) and (35.b) above. How world knowledge is to be 
handled seems to be determined to a large extent by the ellipsis or substitution 
mechanism, which has a procedural nature. Thus so in (35.a) and (35.b) serves 
as an indicator that some conceptual material that was mentioned before has to 
be called up. However, finding what material is relevant is beyond the power of 
the substitution device itself; here we need to make use of discourse principles, 
pragmatic principles, and world knowledge in the way that has been discussed 
above. On the basis of this difference, it seems safe to preserve the distinction 
between cohesion and coherence and redefine it as a distinction between proce-
dural versus lexical or conceptual connectivity.
The distinction between procedural and conceptual (or lexical) connectivity 
ties in with the relevance-theoretic idea that lexical items encode concepts while 
grammatical words encode procedures. This idea has been discussed in some de-
tail by a number of relevance theorists (e.g. Blakemore 1987, Blakemore 1992, 
Wilson and Sperber 1993; see also Blass 1990; Gutt 1991; Moeschler 1989a, 
1989b; Luscher 1989). Let us take one clear example of their position. Accord-
ing to Blakemore (1992), utterance (36) below has the two possible interpreta-
tions specified in (37): 
(36) (a) Peter’s not stupid.  
(b) He can find his own way home. 
(37) (a) Peter’s not stupid; so he can find his own way home. 
(b) Peter’s not stupid; after all, he can find his own way home. 
On the first interpretation, (36.a) provides evidence for the conclusion in (36.b); 
on the second, the statement in (36.a) is confirmed by evidence provided in 
(36.b). Blakemore argues that discourse connectives like ‘so’ and ‘after all’ do 
not encode concepts since they do not contribute to the truth conditions of utter-
ances. They are procedural in nature: they have the function of constraining the 
inferential phase of comprehension by indicating the type of inference process 
that the addressee is expected to go through. Discourse connectives contribute to 
relevance since they guide the addressee towards the intended contextual effects, 
thus reducing the total amount of effort required to derive them. 
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If Blakemore’s account is correct, utterances like (37.a) and (37.b), which 
contain discourse connectives, would require less effort to process than ambigu-
ous utterances like (36) where there is no indication as to the way its two consti-
tuting clauses have to be connected. However, there are two crucial differences 
between the relevance-theoretic understanding of procedural connectivity and 
the one that has presented above in connection with textual cohesion. First, in 
our own account procedural activity is not encoded; lexical connectivity is not 
encoded either. Words, whether grammatical or not, do not encode anything; 
they simply work as clues for the activation of concepts: concept activation is a 
function of words in context and varies with the context in hand. Meaning deri-
vation is a matter of interpretation, not of decoding. That there is not such a 
thing as a direct connection between a word form and its senses has been evi-
denced in our discussion of how central and peripheral aspects of words mean-
ing, selected in terms of their compatibility with contextual information, as illus-
trated by the various uses of the word the mother, are exploited discursively. 
Rather than a direct mapping from form to meaning, what we have is an inter-
pretation task that is regulated by semantic, pragmatic, and discourse principles. 
This interpretation task goes far beyond what is commonly understood by “de-
coding”. Much the same can be said of procedural connectivity. Procedures are 
not coded but suggested. Again, as with lexical interpretation, there are prag-
matic and discourse constraints that determine the actual form of an interpreta-
tion procedure. Second, discourse connectors such as so and after all in (37.a) 
and (37.b) respectively seem to have a different status from substitution, ellipsis, 
and anaphoric mechanisms. These mechanisms are ways of directing the ad-
dressee to perform a mental operation that results in what we have called proce-
dural connectivity. Discourse connectors are not procedural in this sense. In fact, 
it may be argued that they are conceptual. Consider the case of so in (37.a.) 
again. What this connector does is activate an abstract or generic-level cognitive 
model that may be called the evidential model. The internal make-up of this cog-
nitive model is derived from much of our every day experience where we are led 
to believe that something is the case on the basis of information that we consider 
reliable, either because we have had direct sensory access to it or because we 
trust the source that has provided us with it. For example, if we see someone 
climbing through a window into somebody else’s house in the middle of the 
night, we have grounds to believe that the house is being burgled. In the case of 
example (37.a) the evidential model allows us to interpret that the speaker is 
caused to believe that Peter can find his way home because the speaker relies 
that Peter has enough intelligence to do so. The evidential model is activated by 
the discourse connector so in such a way that the grounds precedes the conclu-
sion. In the case of (37.b) we have a different use of the same model, since the 
conclusion statement precedes the grounds statement. The (attested) fact that Pe-
ter can find his own way home allows the speaker to conclude that Peter is not 
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stupid. When the evidential model is activated by after all, the conclusion pre-
cedes the grounds. If we are faced with an utterance like (37) the evidential 
model will be activated in one way or the other depending on other contextual 
factors that allow us to determine which statement was intended as evidence for 
the other.
There are other generic-level cognitive models that may have an impact on 
discourse activity. In a previous section, we have discussed the high-level EF-
FECT FOR CAUSE metonymy. The meaning impact of this metonymy relies on 
a causal model of events, based on our experience with every-day life and na-
ture, in which for every event we assume that there is an underlying cause. In 
fact, one of our main worries is to find about the causes of illness, death, de-
struction, behaviour, and so on. A causal model consists of caused events, insti-
gators, and causing events. This model is usually activated by subordinating 
conjunctions such as because and since, and by discourse connectors (also called 
conjuncts) such as because of this, consequently, accordingly, so, therefore, as a 
consequence, as a result. 
It is possible to postulate other generic-level models but they have no conse-
quences in terms of discourse connectors. Thus we may have an action model,
with such elements as agent, instrument, goal, object, beneficiary; or we may 
have a perception model, with a perceiver and the object of perception; or a con-
trol model, according to which some entities have the power to determine 
whether certain events, states, and situations will hold or not. But we believe 
that the discussion provided above is enough to understand the relevance of the 
distinction between conceptual and procedural connectivity in discourse. 
There is another dimension of discourse connectivity that has been ignored in 
our discussion, i.e. the fact that discourse relations may be guided by iconicity 
(cf. Haiman 1985; Simone 1995; Nänny and Fischer, 1999). It is of course easy 
to find iconicity when we are dealing with temporal sequences: 
 (38) (a) There was a flash of lightning. A thunderclap followed. 
(b) They hit the dog with a stick. The animal turned against its attack-
ers.
(c) They first did a thorough search for the missing file. Then they 
called customer’s service. 
(d) Eight children were sent to hospital after they played with mercury 
dumped in an alley in Montreal’s north end. 
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Examples (38.a)-(38.c) observe iconicity. Temporal sequence is only marked by 
means of grammatical devices in (38.c). In (38.d) the presentation of informa-
tion in the utterance violates iconicity. Iconic utterance configurations, as has 
been shown by psycholinguistic experiments (cf. Noordman and de Blijzer, 
2000), are processed faster. If this is so, in terms of the Principle of Relevance, 
there must be a reason to use non-iconic configurations which offsets the extra 
processing effort. Compare (38.d) with (39): 
(39) Eight children played with mercury dumped in an alley in Montreal’s 
north end. They were sent to hospital. 
The iconic arrangement of facts in utterance (39) does little to draw the ad-
dressee’s attention to the most relevant information, i.e. the dramatic conse-
quences of someone’s negligence. Thus (38.d) has meaning implications that are 
absent from (39) in terms of the seriousness of someone’s carelessness in deal-
ing with such a toxic substance as mercury, and subsequent measures to deter-
mine liability and to prevent something similar from happening again.  
The pragmatic Principle of Relevance predicts that there must be a number of 
extra meaning implications in the non-iconic arrangement of utterances, but it is 
insufficient to determine the interpretative path that the addressee is expected to 
follow. Again, discourse principles come into the picture. Here it will postulated 
that iconicity, at this level of analysis, has discourse principle status and is coun-
teracted by what we will term the Principle of Conceptual Prominence. The 
Principle of Iconicity preserves the actual ordering of events in the world. The 
Principle of Conceptual Prominence presents information in such a way that 
non-iconic prominent information enjoys privileged status. This can be achieved 
by simply presenting the information in a non-iconic ordering, as in (40) below, 
which can be reinforced by grammatical marking, as in (38.d) above where the 
temporal conjunction after makes explicit the non-iconic ordering: 
(40) Eight children were sent to hospital; they had played with mercury 
dumped in an alley in Montreal’s north end. 
Iconicity in discourse is not limited to temporal sequences. Noordman and de 
Blijzer (2000) have explored this principle in cause-effect sequences or, in our 
terminology, causal models. These authors have made a distinction between 
iconic and non-iconic cause-effect sequences. Consider these examples: 
 (41) (a) Norman skipped the red light. His car collided with my car. 
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(b) Norman’s car collided with my car, (because) he skipped the red 
light.
In (41.a) there is an iconic cause-effect construal:  
Sequence of events: Norman skips the red light; his car collides with the 
speaker’s car. 
Cause-effect order: Norman skips the red light; therefore his car collides 
with the speaker’s car. 
In (41.b) there is no iconicity: 
Sequence of events: Norman skips the red light; his car collides with the 
speaker’s car. 
Cause-effect order: Norman’s car collides with the speaker’s car as a result 
of his skipping the red light. 
From a conceptual point of view, the iconic order of cause-effect is about rela-
tions in the world, while the non-iconic representation is about our judgement of 
the relations that hold in the world.
Following Sweetser (1990), the iconic relation would be classified as a con-
tent relation, whereas the non-iconic relation would be considered an epistemic
relation. This distinction also applies to examples of temporal iconicity where 
non-iconic formulations are ways of giving conceptual prominence to relevant 
parts of the representation thereby revealing the speaker’s personal judgement 
about the relative prominence of each item of information. On the other hand, 
the Principle of Conceptual Prominence regulates the meaning import of non-
iconic examples like (41.b), where relative prominence is given to the second 
item in the sequence of events, i.e. the collision of Norman’s car with the 
speaker’s car, with the implication that Norman is fully responsible. 
4.3. Discourse strategies
By a discourse strategy we will understand a non-conventional set of procedures 
that allow the speaker to create a fully meaningful text. Discourse strategies are, 
in this view, subservient to more general communication (or pragmatic) strate-
gies.
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Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal (1997) and Otal (2004) have addressed the issue of 
communication strategies from the relevance-theoretic perspective of communi-
cation. For them, a communication strategy is a set of procedures aimed at 
achieving a certain communicative goal. They distinguish between generic and 
local communication strategies. The former strategies, which are prerequisites 
for the latter, derive from the general balance that we find in linguistic commu-
nication between explicit and implicit information. The latter strategies consist 
in specific sets of procedures used by the speaker to get the addressee to modify 
his cognitive environment (i.e. the set of assumptions he has in his mind) in such 
a way that the speaker’s communicative goals are achieved. Let us illustrate how 
this works. Imagine that a young, creative entrepreneur, Richard, has the goal of 
getting Geoffrey, a close friend of his, to join him in a potentially very profitable 
business venture. Geoffrey is hesitant because he is aware of the risks involved, 
but Richard thinks he knows how to strike the right chord in order to get his 
friend to accept the deal. Richard is aware that Geoffrey is not overly ambitious 
personally, but he also knows that Geoffrey’s wife, Margie, has always had the 
desire to see her family climb up the social ladder. In this context, Richard pro-
duces utterance (42) below: 




Get Geoffrey to disregard his fears so that he will join 
Richard in his business venture 
Communica-
tive goal 
Have Geoffrey build into his cognitive environment the 
assumption that Richard really wants Geoffrey to take 
part in the business venture and that he can please his 
wife if he does that
Communica-
tive strategy 
Make an indirect request to Geoffrey based upon the idea 
that Geoffrey’s wife will be pleased and proud of her 
husband if he goes into business so that he feels there is 
an additional reason to accept Richard’s proposal. Reit-
erate the idea in such a way that it looks as if Richard is 




Make a statement of fact that specifies that Margie will 
be predictably happy about the venture and proud of her 
husband joining in. Indicate that the speaker is aware that 
the addressee can make the same prediction about his 
wife’s attitude. 
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Utterance (42) is one possible way of fleshing out the realization procedure. 
There could be others: 
(43) (a) Your wife will really be happy that you are part of all this, and 
she’ll be very proud of you too. I know you know. 
(b) You know and I know that Margie will love this whole idea and 
think of how much pride she will take in you. 
(c) Margie is gonna like all this stuff a lot and she sure is gonna be so 
proud of you. You know. 
Language use is not a fully constrained, stilted form of behaviour, but allows for 
a degree of variation provided that the essential aspects of the communicator’s 
goals are met. The lexicogrammar is a complex system of resources that works 
in consonance with the full context of assumptions that speaker and addressee 
are presumed to have in their minds.  
Discourse strategies are concerned with the creation of meaningful text. There 
are at least two crucial aspects in which discourse may be said to be strategic: 
1. Speakers have to decide how to make discourse achieve a sufficient de-
gree of connectivity. 
2. Speakers need to take control of the way discourse is managed interac-
tively (follow the rules of the turn-taking system).  
Think again of utterance (42) above. We have specified the underlying commu-
nication strategy which exploits common pragmatic principles of social interac-
tion. Thus, an indirect request gives the addressee greater leeway to accept or re-
ject what the speaker wants; so the addressee of (42) cannot complain that he is 
being put pressure on. But at the same time, the speaker is skilfully using the 
pragmatic cost-benefit scale to his advantage: he is reminding the addressee that 
it would be a good idea to make Margie happy (benefit to Geoffrey’s wife) in 
such a way that this also turns beneficial to the addressee himself (the addressee 
will be in good terms with his wife). Indirectly, this is expected to turn benefi-
cial for the speaker himself (he has a greater chance of getting what he wants), 
but it is more difficult for the addressee that the speaker is being selfish, since 
the speaker’s benefit has been carefully disguised as an altruistic act.  
This is how the strategy works at what we shall call, for reasons that will be-
come apparent below, the local level of pragmatic activity. But the strategy also 
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exploits discourse principles. In the example under discussion, the communica-
tion strategy consists of a fairly large amount of conceptual material, as is evi-
dent from the specification given above. Since the speaker has decided to make 
an indirect request that exploits the idea that Geoffrey’s wife will be pleased and 
proud, the first procedure selected to realize this strategy is to make a statement 
that will give the addressee inferential access to all of the remaining material in 
the communicative strategy in terms of the conventional cost benefit-scale. The 
second (complementary) procedure consists in treating all of the conceptual 
structure in the communicative strategy as if already known by the addressee. 
Part of the information is made explicit while the rest is to be inferred. In this 
connection, Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal (1997), and Otal (2004) have made a dis-
tinction between three general (i.e. non-local) level or high-level communication 
strategies that are derived directly from the relationship between explicit and 
implicit information is verbal messages: (i) information strategies; (ii) contex-
tual strategies; (iii) negotiation strategies.
There are two information strategies: 
[1] Use a signal that is poor in explicit assumptions and leaves a lot to in-
ferencing;
[2] Use a signal that is rich in explicit assumptions so that inferential activ-
ity is reduced to a minimum. 
These two are speaker’s strategies and they represent ends of a continuum: 
speakers may want to strike a balance between the amounts of explicit and in-
ferred material involved in processing an utterance. 
There are also two contextual strategies: 
[1] Make use of the minimum contextual information and rely maximally 
on textual features;
[2] Make use of the maximum contextual information and rely minimally 
on textual features. 
These two are also ends of a continuum, like information strategies, but they 
work from the addressee’s point of view.  
Finally, negotiation strategies are made up of a number of repair procedures 
plus some (optional) cooperative attempt(s) by the interlocutor(s) either to make 
the repair or to make manifest where they believe the repair is needed. 
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High-level communication strategies constrain realization procedures. Once a 
local or low-level communication strategy has been set up, the speaker will have 
to decide on the degree of explicitness (and/or subsequent formal complexity of 
his message). This involves the selection of a high-level strategy and, from a 
discourse point of view, a careful management of the information. Thus, an ex-
cessive lack of cohesive ties (procedural devices) will place a heavy processing 
load in terms of coherence (conceptual connectivity). Conversely, placing all the 
emphasis on procedural connectivity may not take sufficient advantage of the 
range of communicative interplay possibilities that may be triggered off by leav-
ing it up to the addressee to work out what connections are to be made. Imagine 
utterance (42) without the use of the conjunction and:
(42’) Margie will really love it. She’ll be proud of you. You know that. 
The conjunction and has a pragmatic value that has been explored by Carston 
(1988, 1993) within the relevance-theoretic framework. For her, the role of and
is not to set up causal or precedence relationships; rather, this conjunction serves 
as an indication to the addressee that he has to process the resulting complex 
sentence as a single pragmatic unit. One of the examples she gives is illustrating 
(cf. Carston 1993: 42): 
 (44) (a) I ate somewhere nice last week; I ate at Macdonalds. 
(b) I ate somewhere nice last week and I ate at Macdonalds. 
In the case of (44.a) the second clause is a specification as to where the speaker 
went to have his dinner. In contrast the second clause in (44.b) has an amplify-
ing function with respect to the first. It is like saying ‘I ate somewhere nice last 
week and, just in case you want to know where, I ate at Macdonalds’. Utterance 
(44.a) leaves open how the first and second clause could be connected; it is up to 
the hearer to work it out. 
A similar reasoning applies to the connection between the two clauses Margie 
will really love it and She’ll be proud of you. In (42) the conjunction has a pro-
cedural function that constrains the addressee to consider the two clauses as a 
single pragmatic unit. This constraint does not hold for (42’), however, where it 
is up to the addressee to think of the two clauses as combining into one complex 
conceptual unit. Note that the antecedent for that in (42) is the whole clause 
complex (Margie will really love it and she’ll be proud of you), whereas in (42’) 
that may either refer only to the second clause (She’ll be proud of you) or to the 
conceptual combination of the two, as in (42). Because of the greater distance 
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between that and the first clause, this clause will not be a likely candidate for the 
anaphoric operation. 
Discourse strategies not only depend upon the nature of a speaker’s commu-
nicative strategies, whether higher or lower level. Crucially enough, they are 
also tied to specific realization procedures whereby the speaker determines the 
kind of pragmatic acts that will be used to achieve a specific communicative 
strategy. There are two reverse options in terms of connectivity: 
[1] Maximize the amount of conceptual connections and minimize the 
amount of procedural connections. 
[2] Maximize the amount of procedural connections and minimize the 
amount of conceptual connections. 
However, the issue is a bit more complicated than appears at first sight since 
connectivity is constrained by discourse principles that limit the extent of appli-
cation of the two reverse strategies above. Consider the following example pre-
sented by Blass (1990: 17) as creating coherence by means of relations of an-
tonymy or semantic opposition: 
(45) The wise master makes his servants respect him. The unwise master 
makes his servants despise him. 
But there is much more that we can say about the nature of the coherence rela-
tions in (45). It is apparent that the meaning impact of this text is based upon 
contrast between the opposing behaviour of the wise and the unwise master and 
that contrast relations can be made explicit: 
(45’) a. The wise master makes his servants respect him. However (in contrast, 
etc.), the unwise master makes his servants despise him. 
b. While the wise master makes his servants respect him, the unwise 
master makes his servants despise him 
Text (45) follows strategy [1] and the texts in (45’) follow strategy [2]. This has 
consequences in terms of what is communicated. In (45) the contrast between 
the wise and the unwise masters is sharper than in (45’.a) and (45’.b). This is so 
because such discourse connectors as however or in contrast, or the subordinat-
ing conjunction while, contrast whole propositions, but in (45) the contrast is not 
only between two propositions but very markedly between different components 
of each proposition (‘wise’ versus ‘unwise’, ‘respect’ versus ‘despise’). The dis-
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course principle that accounts for coherence or conceptual connectivity in (45) is 
therefore different from the principle that underlies the examples in (45’). We 
shall refer to the former as the Principle of Internal Contrast, and to the latter as 
the Principle of External Contrast. Focus upon external contrast demands ex-
plicitly invoked procedural operations. The greater prominence of internal con-
trast, however, calls for conceptual connectivity. 
Let us now take an example of somewhat problematic procedural connectivity 
or cohesion: 
(46) The baby cried. The mommy picked it up. 
This example from Sacks (1972) is very well known in the literature on conver-
sation management. The usual claim is that (46) illustrates the claim that the in-
terpretation of later utterances in discourse is highly influenced by earlier ones. 
For Sacks, it would be normal to interpret it in (46) as referring to the baby. 
However, there may be contexts where it refers to an object, such as a toy that 
the baby has dropped. In order to cope with this problem, Brown and Yule 
(1983: 65) proposed a discourse principle that they called the “principle of anal-
ogy”. The explanation they give of this principle is rather abstruse: unless we are 
given specific notice that something has changed, we assume that everything 
remains as before. This seems to mean that we interpret some utterances on the 
grounds of their analogy with what we conventionally know about the world. In 
the case of (46) the mommy picked it up refers to the baby because picking up a 
bay when it cries is conventional behaviour. In the absence of other linguistic 
clues, it is this interpretation that would be favoured by the addressee. 
Brown and Yule’s principle of analogy is simply a principle that matches ut-
terances and corresponding world knowledge (idealized cognitive models in 
cognitive linguistics terminology). However, it is difficult to see how this prin-
ciple is capable of selecting the right referent for a potentially ambiguous pro-
noun when we have two conventional scenarios that may equally apply to it on 
the basis of analogy. Imagine the following extension of (46): 
(46’) The baby dropped the toy and cried. The mommy picked it up. 
In (46’) we have the problem that picking up a toy that has been accidentally 
dropped (and giving it back to the baby) is just as conventional as picking up a 
crying baby. So, there is no way in which the principle of analogy can solve the 
ambiguity of it here.
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Another discourse principle proposed by Brown and Yule (1983: 59) is the 
“principle of local interpretation”. This principle instructs the hearer not to con-
struct a context “any larger than he needs to arrive at an interpretation”. If the 
hearer hears someone say Shut the door!, he will look towards the nearest door 
available for being shut. This principle is problematic, as we shall see, but even 
if it were a correct principle, it would still be of no use to explain (46’). Thus, 
both the context in which the baby is picked up and the context in which the toy 
is picked up are not any larger than needed for interpretation.
The following example has been taken from Leech (1983): 
(47) If the baby won’t drink the milk, it should be boiled. 
This example is discussed by Leech in the context of his proposal of textual 
maxims regulating the processability of texts. The maxims are not our concern 
here, but rather the question of the (probably unintended) ambiguity of it in (47) 
in comparison with the ambiguity of it in (46’). There are two reasons why it in 
(47) is readily taken to refer to the milk and not the baby (in spite of the pun). 
One is because of the relatively short distance between it and milk in the expres-
sion. The other is a matter of matching the information in the text with what we 
know about the world but in a different way from what is suggested by Brown 
and Yule’s analogy principle. There is no conventional context in which people 
boil babies. So the issue here is one of conceivability: a situation in which peo-
ple will boil the baby rather than the milk is not conceivable. The Principle of 
Conceivability provides a better explanation of (46’) than analogy: it is equally 
conceivable to have a situation in which the mother will pick up the baby as a 
situation in which the mother will pick up the toy. This discourse principle li-
censes the two possible interpretations of (46’). As for (46), where there may or 
may not be a toy, the analysis of the relationship between the utterance and its 
context of production will determine whether it refers to the baby, to the toy, or 
even to another object. 
In (47) both the inconceivability of a situation and the relative distance be-
tween pronoun and antecedent help us to resolve a potential ambiguity. But 
these two reasons do not necessarily work in combination. Compare: 
(48) The engine came to a stop and a loose screw fell off.
(a) Bill tried to put it back in place 
(b) Bill tried to fix it. 
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(c) Bill didn’t say anything; he just pointed at it. 
The Principle of Conceivability licenses anaphoric reference of it to the screw in 
(48.a) and to the engine in (48.b). Utterance (48.c) seems to favour reference to 
the screw on the basis of relative distance, although from the point of view of 
conceivability both the screw and the engine could be referred to. Like conceiv-
ability, Relative Distance has the status of a discourse principle since it con-
strains discourse activity. 
5. Conclusion 
Discourse is a tightly controlled strategic activity, regulated by principles that 
are grounded in semantics and pragmatics. We have thus studied a range of se-
mantic and pragmatic phenomena that have evident consequences for the con-
struction of discourse. These phenomena have been recognized with the help of 
some of the analytical tools provided by cognitive semantics (e.g. such notions 
as cluster models, metaphor, metonymy, and the relevance of the distinction be-
tween centre-periphery in semantic specifications) and by the varied implica-
tions of the pragmatic Principle of Relevance, crucially those concerned with the 
balance between efforts (i.e. cognitive economy) and effect (i.e. meaning im-
pact), on the one hand, and between implicit and explicit information, on the 
other.
Our study of the way we make use of cognitive models in discourse, has al-
lowed us to postulate two principles, related to metaphor, that so far have been 
not taken account of in the cognitive linguistics literature: the first and second 
principles of Metaphoric Source Selection. The literature on metaphor has only 
postulated principles that focus on the way correspondences are made, like La-
koff’s (1990, 1993) well-known Invariance Hypothesis. These principles have 
important consequences in order to understand the discourse potential of meta-
phorical expressions: the metaphorical extension of a concept can only select 
partial structure from this concept to construct the metaphoric source, that is, not 
all meaning components are exploited; if we have a cluster of models, meta-
phorical extensions may only use partial structure from one of the models in the 
cluster. This means that it is only such selected structure that is available to cre-
ate conceptual ties in discourse. 
The recognition of degrees of centrality in semantic specifications underlies 
the Peripherality Principle. This is not a semantic but a discourse principle 
grounded in the Principle of Relevance. When the most central characterization 
of a concept is not capable of creating discourse coherence, speakers turn to less 
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central specifications and select the one that best satisfies conditions of rele-
vance. This principle has been shown to underlie cases where for some meta-
phorical extensions of concepts based on non-central characterizations to be 
possible at all, the speaker needs to place them within an alternative mental 
space.
The present study has also addressed the question of the discourse potential of 
metonymic operations, an issue that has not been explored by cognitive semanti-
cists, probably because of the common failure to realize that metonymy is not 
just a local phenomenon dealing with shifts of referent. Some scholars have al-
ready pointed out that metonymy is pervasive in language use and have postu-
lated that it underlies such pragmatic phenomena as implicature-derivation and 
(indirect) illocutionary activity. To the extent that implicature and indirect illo-
cution are to be accounted for in terms of the explicit-implicit dichotomy, these 
pragmatic phenomena are essential for a smooth discourse flow where speakers 
may refer to previous implicit information. Metonymic activity thus underlies 
this aspect of discourse coherence. This observation is but a natural consequence 
of recent developments in the study of metonymy and should not come as a sur-
prise. Nevertheless, this research work has also shown that metonymy is also es-
sential for a correct understanding of some cases of discourse cohesion. Since 
cohesion is usually considered a clear grammatical phenomenon, this claim 
could be a bit more controversial. This research work has provided evidence that 
anaphora is a conceptual mechanism, which ties in with previous work on the 
role of metonymy in accounting for some anaphoric operations.  
We now turn to the connection between pragmatics and discourse. Semantics 
(or rather a maximalist version of semantics) has allowed us to explore those as-
pects of discourse connectivity that are related to cognitive model theory. In re-
lation to this, we have seen how relevance plays a very important role in con-
straining the selection of semantic features that will be used to determine the 
flow of discourse. But pragmatic activity has an even more important role in 
regulating discourse. In order to show what this role is, this research work has 
addressed the question of the pragmatic grounding of so-called cohesion and co-
herence in discourse. Within this framework, the present research claims that el-
lipsis and substitution are discourse phenomena subject to pragmatic constraints 
and argues for the existence of a discourse principle called the Conceptual
Structure Selection Principle. This principle accounts for the semantic scope of 
ellipsis and substitution mechanisms: these have within their scope as much 
structure as is not cancelled out by the discourse unit that contains the cohesion 
device.
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We have then redefined the cohesion-coherence distinction as one between 
procedural and conceptual connectivity. Relevance theory pragmatics has pro-
vided us with the theoretical underpinnings to justify this redefinition, although 
there are differences with the relevance theoretic approach in that we do not ap-
ply the procedural-conceptual distinction to discourse connectors, as relevance 
theorists do. While ellipsis and substitution devices are procedural (they guide 
the hearer to a certain portion of previous discourse to make ties with it), dis-
course connectives seem to invoke generic-level cognitive models and may thus 
be considered conceptual rather than procedural. 
Two further principles that have been found in connection to the issue of dis-
course connectivity are the Principle of Iconicity and the Principle of Concep-
tual Prominence. The study of iconicity as a pervasive principle at levels of lin-
guistic description, including syntax, has a long tradition in linguistics, espe-
cially in functional and cognitive orientations. There is a large amount of evi-
dence that iconic arrangements are an important aspect of discourse coherence. 
Still, there is little work done with respect to the principles that regulate non-
iconic arrangements. In order to fill this vacuum, we have postulated the Princi-
ple of Conceptual Prominence, which accounts for the special discourse status of 
non-iconic prominent information.  
The final part of this research work has focused upon the analysis of dis-
course-strategic behaviour. Discourse strategies are non-conventional sets of 
procedures that allow speakers to create and interpret procedurally and concep-
tually connected texts. Discourse strategies are grounded in low-level and high-
level pragmatic principles that have been fully explored in previous work by the 
authors. Two reverse discourse strategies are formulated, both related to the bal-
ance between procedural and conceptual markers of discourse connectivity. To 
this we add two reverse discourse principles, the Principle of Internal Contrast 
and the Principle of External Contrast, the former based upon explicit proce-
dural operations, whereas the latter makes use of conceptual connectivity.  
Lastly, we distinguish two more discourse principles that constrain strategic 
discourse activity in terms of the procedural-conceptual distinction, i.e. the 
Principle of Conceivability and the Principle of Relative Distance. The former 
regulates conceptual links with situations in terms of the possibility of creating 
plausible mental scenarios for them. The latter usually works in combination 
with the former to help to solve ambiguities in anaphoric pronouns in terms of 
the relative distance between the anaphoric device and its potential as licensed 
by the Principle of Conceivability.  
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MODELIRANJE MISLI U JEZI NOJ UPORABI:
NA RAZME I DISKURSA, PRAGMATIKE I SPOZNAJE
U ovom se radu raspravlja o nizu semanti kih i pragmati kih pojava koje utje u na razvoj 
diskursa. Na temelju prou avanja na ina na koje se kognitivni modeli rabe u diskursu pos-
tulirali smo “na elo odabira metafori koga izvora:” naime, metafori ka ekstenzija koncepta 
može odabrati samo dio strukture takvoga koncepta za stvaranje metafori koga izvora. 
Nadalje, uvažavanje stupnjevitosti u poimanju semanti kih odrednica kao više ili manje 
središnjih u osnovi je “Nóna ela rubnosti”, diskursnog na ela utemeljenog u “na elu rele-
vantnosti”: ukoliko se odabirom središnjih odrednica nekoga koncepta ne može osigurati 
diskursna koherencija, govornik pribjegava odabiru rubnijih odrednica, odnosno odabiru one 
koja najviše udovoljava na elima relevantnosti. Potom se u radu osvr emo na pitanje prag-
mati ke utemeljenosti takozvane diskursne kohezije i koherentnosti. U tom kontekstu tvrdimo 
da su elipsa i supstitucija kao diskursne pojave podložne pragmati kim ograni enjima te 
zagovaramo postojanje “na ela odabira konceptualne strukture” kojim se objašnjava seman-
ti ki doseg elipse i sredstava supstitucije: u njihovom je dosegu onoliko strukture koliko se ne 
poništava diskursnom jedinicom u kojoj se nalazi dano kohezivno sredstvo. Potom smo rede-
finirali razliku izme u kohezije i koherentnosti, tvrde i da se tu radi o razlici izme u proce-
duralne i konceptualne uvezanosti; pritom smo formulirali dodatna dva na ela uvezanosti 
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diskursa: “na elo ikoni nosti” i “na elo konceptualne istaknutosti”. Puno je dokaza u prilog 
istaknutoj ulozi ikoni ne organizacije diskursa u ostvarenju diskursne koherentnosti. Me u-
tim, malo je pozornosti dosad posve eno na elima koja ure uju neikoni nu organizaciju 
diskursa. Tomu se može dosko iti postuliranjem na ela konceptualne istaknutosti, kojim se 
objašnjava poseban status u diskursu istaknutih neikoni nih informacija. U zadnjem se dijelu 
ovog istraživanja usredoto ujemo na analizu diskursnih strategija kao nekonvencionalnih 
skupova postupaka koji govornicima omogu avaju stvarati i tuma iti proceduralno i koncep-
tualno uvezane tekstove. U tom smo smislu formulirali dvije me usobno suprotstavljene 
diskursne strategije, pri emu se obje odnose na ravnotežu izme u proceduralnih i konceptu-
alnih obilježja uvezanosti diskursa. Tomu smo dodali dva daljnja diskursna na ela, “na elo 
unutarnjega kontrasta” i “na elo vanjskoga kontrasta”. Prvo se temelji na eksplicitnim proce-
duralnim aktivnostima, a drugo na konceptualnoj uvezanosti. Kona no, utvrdili smo dodatna 
dva diskursna na ela koja usmjeravaju odabir strateških postupaka u stvaranju diskursa: “na-
elo pojmljivosti”, u skladu s kojim se odre uju konceptualne veze sa situacijama u smislu 
mogu nosti stvaranja njihovih vjerodostojnih mentalnih scenarija; i “na elo relativne uda-
ljenosti”, koje pomaže razriješiti višezna nost u interpretaciji anafora na temelju relativne 
udaljenosti anafori ke zamjenice od njezinog mogu eg antecedenta u skladu s na elom
pojmljivosti. 
Klju ne rije i: diskurs; pragmatika; kognitivni modeli, metafora; metonimija; kohezija; 
oherentnost; uvezanost diskursa; relevantnost; ikoni nost.
